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NOTES
HEPATITIS B AND DENTISTRY: MEDICO-LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DENTIST TO PATIENT
TRANSMISSION
Viral hepatitis' poses great concern to the health care professional.
The disease presents an occupational hazard2 to all members of the
health care profession and especially to dentists3 because of its oral
mode of transmission.4 The concern, however, lies not only with the
health care worker who contracts the disease, but also with those who
transmit the infection to their patients.
This Note explores the medico-legal implications of dentist to patient
transmission, focusing on whether dentists can or should be held liable
for transmitting hepatitis to their patients. Part One of this Note dis-
cusses the epidemiology of hepatitis. Part Two examines available hep-
atitis prevention and control measures emphasizing the current dental
standard of care in light of these safeguards. Part Three describes the
present state of medical malpractice law in the areas of standard of
care, informed consent and res ipsa loquitur. Part Four provides a syn-
thesis of the existing case law and the current dental standard of care
towards a determination of whether courts will hold dentists liable for
transmitting hepatitis to their patients.
I. EPIDEMIOLOGY OF HEPATITIS
The liver performs functions vital to the human body,5 yet it remains
susceptible to a variety of diseases.6 The most common disease is hepa-
1. Viral Hepatitis is an "[inflammation of the liver; either viral hepatitis type A or type B;
in the acute stage both types are characterized by necrosis of scattered liver cells and periportal
inflammation, mainly by lymphocytes." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 636 (23d ed. 1976).
For a more detailed description, see infra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
5. The liver cleanses blood returning from the intestines, manufactures bile to facilitate the
digestion of fats, and produces various proteins including those involved in blood coagulation.
Gill, Stout, Fast & Ragan, Facts You Should Know About Hepatitis , DENTAL STUDENT, Sept.
1982, 11, 11 [hereinafter cited as Facts You Should Know].
6. A few of the more common liver diseases include Curschmann's disease, alcoholic cirrho-
sis, and cancer. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 802 (23d ed. 1976).
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titis, 7 most frequently caused by a viral infection.'
Viral hepatitis exists in two forms:9 type A (HAV-formerly known
as infectious hepatitis) and type B (HBV-formerly known as serum
hepatitis).' 0 Though clinically HAV and HBV resemble each other, the
two forms vary greatly in the mode of transmission and in the severity
of the disease."1 HBV is the more serious of the two and the one most
frequently transmitted from dentist to patient.'2 Hence, HBV serves as
the focus of this Note.
HBV, an often severe and debilitating form of the disease with a
7. Facts You Should Know, supra note 5, at 11.
8. Other causes of hepatitis include chronic alcohol ingestion and toxic effects of drugs. Id.
9. A newly discovered form, type non-A non-B, is currently under widespread study. Facts
You Should Know, supra note 5, at 11.
10. The medical profession labeled hepatitis type A "infectious hepatitis" because of the be-
lief that the intestinal-oral route transmitted the virus. In the past, the medical profession referred
to hepatitis type B as "serum hepatitis" because of the belief that infected blood transmitted it via
the parenteral route. Hepatitis type B, however, can also be contracted by infected saliva. There-
fore the terms infectious and serum hepatitis are no longer appropriate. Smith, Viral Hepatitis-
An Occupational Risk of Dentists, 55 Nw DENTISTRY 202, 202-203 (1976).
11. Viral hepatitis A (HAV) is the milder of the two viral forms. It has a relatively short
incubation period, usually between fifteen and forty days. The illness usually begins with fatigue
and may be accompanied by abdominal discomfort. From two to fourteen days later, jaundice,
dark urine, and light stool may appear. In most instances the onset is acute, with jaundice appear-
ing early, accompanied by fever and chills. In some cases, however, the patient fails to recognize
jaundice and may be aware of only flu-like symptoms. Almost all HAV infections result in only
minor illness. Fever and other symptoms usually subside within a week, and jaundice disappears
within two or three weeks.
The mode of transmission is generally the fecal-oral route among persons living in close con-
tact. Because of this, HAV tends to have a higher incidence among children, whose lack of hy-
gienic habits encourages fecal-oral spread to other children and adults. Health authorities also
have traced outbreaks of HAV to contaminated water supplies or ingestion of infected shellfish.
Although transmission of HAV is most frequently oral, evidence exists that it may also be trans-
mitted parenterally.
Viral Hepatitis B (HBV) is the most serious viral form. It requires a long incubation period of
anywhere from six weeks to six months. Clinical symptoms resemble the type A infection, but the
illness tends to be more severe, requiring hospitalization for extended periods. Experts estimate
the mortality rate at about ten percent, but during certain outbreaks estimates reach as high as 35
percent. Infection commonly transmits HBV via a parenteral route during transfusions of blood
and blood products, or by some other form of innoculation, particularly those by parenteral drug
abusers. See Alter, Holland & Purcell, Viral Hepatitis, Light at the End of the Tunnel, 229
J.A.M.A. 293, 293-94 (1974); Hribar, Viral Hepatitis: A Review of Clinical, Laboratory and Re-
search Aspects, 22 AUSTL. DENTAL J. 471,471-75 (1977); Reed & Boyer, Viralhepatltis: Epidemi.
ological, Serologic and Clinical Manifestations, 25 DISEAsE-A-MONTH 6, 6-15 (1979); Rothstein,
Goldman & Arcomano, Hepatitis B Virus. An Overviewfor Dentists, 102 J.A.D.A. 173, 173-74
(1981) [hereinafter cited as An OvervieaW. See also Mosley, The Epidemiology of Viral Hepatitis.:
An Overview, 270 AM. J. MED. ScI. 253, 253-65 (1975).
12. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/4
Number 2] VIRAL HEPATITIS
mortality rate approaching ten percent, greatly concerns United States
health officials today.' 3 Several aspects of the disease contribute to this
concern. First, in the last two decades the United States witnessed a
dramatic increase in the reported incident rate. In 1966, the Center for
Disease Control received reports of 1,497 cases; by 1981, this figure in-
creased almost twenty-fold to 21,152 cases.' 4 Even more startling, the
reported cases account for only ten to twenty percent of the cases that
occur.'-' Experts estimate that the incidence of HBV approaches
200,000 new cases annually. 16
Another concern is the disease in its carrier state. 1 Of the estimated
200,000 individuals likely to contract HBV in a given year, approxi-
mately 56,000 individuals will have no clinical symptoms' 8 and 12,000
to 20,000 will become chronic carriers of the disease.19 Of the esti-
mated 800,000 carriers today in the United States, many experience no
clinical symptoms. 2° These asymptomatic carriers pose a serious threat
to others because, unaware of the presence of the disease and of their
13. Reed & Boyer, supra note 11, at 8.
14. Center for Disease Control, Immune Globulins for Protection Against Viral Hepatitis, 26
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 425, 426-27 (1978). U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 1981 Annual Summary, 30 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 6 (1982).
15. An Overview, supra note 11, at 174.
16. See Facts You Should Know, supra note 5, at 11.
17. An understanding of the carrier state necessitates a discussion of the HBV antigen-an-
tibody systems.
An antigen is any foreign material (i.e., microorganisms, toxins, foreign proteins, foreign cells or
tissues, etc.) that produces an antibody response. The body produces an antibody that serves to
neutrahze the antigen and thus produces immunity to certain foreign matters. See STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 88, 91 (23d ed. 1976).
HBV uses three antigen-antibody systems. The HBV surface antigen, designated HBsAg, pro-
duces the corresponding antibody HBsAb. The core antigen, HB.Ag, also has a corresponding
antibody, HB0 AB. Medical researchers recently discovered the third antigen-antibody system, the
"e" system (HBeAg and HB.Ab).
During the course of a typical acute infection, tests can detect the surface antigen (HBsAg) in
the serum four to eight weeks before clinical symptoms occur. Soon thereafter HBeAg and HB-
,Ab become detectable. In contrast the antibody of HBsAg (HBsAb) appears much later and may
persist indefinitely producing lifetime immunity from future exposures. Generally, complete re-
covery follows; however, acute hepatitis can proceed to chronic hepatitis with HBsAg and HBcAb
persisting and with no detectable HBSAb. The carrier appears asymptomatic and may be infec-
tious for a lifetime. See Mosley, supra note 11, at 258-65; Reed & Boyer, supra note 11, at 11-15.
18. An Overview, supra note 11, at 174. In these individuals, the body produces HBsAb in
amounts equivalent to that present in individuals who had clinical symptoms after recovery. Id.
19. See Facts You Should Know, supra note 5, at 11.
20. Reed & Boyer, supra note 11, at 35-36.
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carrier status, they exercise none of the precautions necessary to pre-
vent the spread of HBV.
Infected blood most commonly transmits HBV via a parenteral
route.21 Recently, several case studies documented transmission by sa-
liva and other bodily fluids.22 As dentists work in the oral cavity of
their patients this mode of transmission places the dentist at an espe-
cially high risk of contracting and later transmitting the disease. 3
They use sharp cutting instruments and high speed drills that expose
them to a mixture of blood and saliva.24 In addition, dentists often
sustain minor cuts or abrasions on their hands due to the use of these
instruments.25 These cuts and abrasions serve as a point of entry for
the patient's infected blood.26 Further, because as little as 1 x 10-7 ml.
of contaminated blood may transmit the virus, a doctor's minor cutane-
ous breaks subsequently may transmit the disease to other patients.27
This represents more than mere conjecture. Since 1974 at least five
investigations by various centers for disease control implicated dental
professionals as the source of HBV infection for their patients. 28 Addi-
21. An Overview, supra note 11, at 173. "Parenteral" means "[b]y some other means than
through the intestinal canal, referring particularly to the introduction of nutritive material into
veins and subcutaneous tissues." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1032 (23d ed. 1976).
22. See Smith, supra note 10, at 203-05. For instance, aerosol produced by high speed instru-
ments also transmits HBV as do airbom droplets of saliva and blood. Goebel, Reliability of Medi-
cal History in Identifying Patients Likely to Place Dentists at Increased Hepatitis Risk, 98 J.A.D.A.
907, 910 (1979); Villarejos, Visona, Guitierrez & Rodriguez, Role ofSaliva, Urine andFeces in the
Transmission of Type B Hepatitis, 291 NEw ENG. J. MED., 1375, 1375-78 (1974).
23. Dentists engaged in private practice treat an average of 3,500 patients per year. Council
on Dental Materials and Devices & Council on Dental Therapeutics, Infection Control in the Den-
tal Office, 97 J.A.D.A. 673 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Infection Control]. This average approxi-
mates 16 patients a day.
24. See Glazer, Spatz & Catone, Viral Hepatitis: A Hazard to Oral Surgeons, 31 J. ORAL
SURGERY 504, 504-08 (1973).
25. Id
26. The existing medical literature cites this situation as the primary source of patient to
dentist transmission. See, e.g., Feldman & Schiff, Hepatitis in DentalProfessionals, 232 J.A.M.A.
1228, 1230 (1975); Mosley, Edwards, Casey, Redeker & White, Heptatis B Virus Infection in Den-
tists, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 729, 729-34 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Infection in Dentists]; Sywas-
sink & Lutwick, Risk ofHeatitis B in Dental Care Providers: A Contact Stud, 105 J. A.D.A. 182
(1983).
27. See, e.g., Facts You Should Know, supra note 5, at 12-14; Hribar, supra note 11, at 475;
Smith supra note 10, at 203. Experts most frequently cite such cutaneous transmission as the
source of dentist to patient transmission. Id.
28. Goodwin, Fannin & McCracken, Epidemiology of an Oral Surgery Related Outbreak of
Hepatitis B, 14 CAL. MORBIDITY 304, 304-09 (1976) (at least 55 cases of HBV traced to oral sur-
geon); Hadler, An Outbreak of epatitis B in a Dental Practice, 95 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
133, 133-38 (1981) (six cases of HBV traced to general dentist); Levin, Maddrey, Wands &
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tionally, several studies found that general dentists have an overall
HBV incidence rate of 13.6 percent and that oral surgeons have an inci-
dence rate of 21 percent.2 9 This rate compares with an incidence of
only two to three percent of the general population.30  The carrier rate
among dental personnel of one or two percent, or ten to twenty times
greater than the general population, is correspondingly high.
II. HBV PREVENTION AND THE DENTAL STANDARD OF CARE
The actual number of hepatitis type B cases transmitted because of
dental treatment remains low compared to the total HBV cases occur-
ring annually.32 Notwithstanding, the dentist's constant exposure to vi-
ral transmittors, as well as the documentation of dentist to patient
Medeloff, Hepatitis B Transmission by Dentists, 228 J.A.M.A. 1139, 1139-40 (1974) (12 cases of
HBV traced to general dentist); Reingold, Kane, Murphy, Checko, Francis & Maynard, Transmis-
sion of Hepatitis B by an Oral Surgeon, 145 J. INFECTIOUS DIsEAsE 262, 262-68 (1982) (52 cases of
HBV traced to oral surgeon); Rimland, Parkin, Miller & Schrack, Hepatitis B Outbreak Traced to
an Oral Surgeon, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 953, 953-58 (1977) (55 cases of HBV traced to oral
surgeon). See generally Ahtone & Goodman, Hepatitis B and Dental Personnel- Transmission to
Patients and Prevention Issues, 106 J.A.D.A. 219 (1983) (discussing in detail case histories of den-
tist to patient transmission) [hereinafter cited as Hepatitis B and Dental Personnel].
29. See Crawford, New Light of the Transmissibility of Viral Hepatitis in Dental Practice and
its Control, 91 J.A.D.A. 829, 829-30 (1975); Infection in Dentists, supra note 26, at 729-34; Facts
You Should Know, supra note 5, at 12. See generally Lewis, A Comparison of the Frequency of
Hepatitis B Antigen and Antibody in Hospital and Nonhospital Personnel, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED.
647, 647-51 (1973) (dentists, among other health care professionals, participated in a test to detect
prevalence of HBV in hospital personnel).
30. Krugman & Goeke, Viral Hepatitis, 15 PRoBs. IN INTERNAL MED. 1, 6 (1978).
31. See Alexander, Hepatitis Risk- A Clinical Perspective, 102 J. A.D.A. 182, 183 (1981); In-
fection Control, supra note 23, at 673; Shields, Dentistry and the Issue of Hepatitis B, 102 J.A.D.A.
180, 180-82 (1981). Withers, Hepatitis: A Review of the Disease and Its Sign#Fcance to Dentistry, 51
J. PERIODONTOLOGY 162, 164 (1980).
Not all carriers transmit hepatitis to their patients. Researchers believe that the perpetuation of
the "e" antigen-antibody system makes some carriers more infectious than others. See, e.g.,
Hribar, supra note 11, at 473; Tullman, Boozer, Villarejos & Feary, The Threat of Hepatitis Bfrom
Dental School Patients, 49 ORAL SURGERY, ORAL MED. AND ORAL PATHOLOGY 214, 216 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as The Threat of Hepatitis].
One researcher suggests that three factors account for the transmission by some carriers and not
by others: (1) the variability of infectivity of the virus carrier;, (2) the variability of the nature of
patient exposure (i.e., amount of blood likely to result from the procedure); and, (3) the variability
in the potential virus contamination of patient tissues by the infected HBV carrier. See Hadler,
upra note 28, at 136-37.
32. Studies estimate that one percent of all reported HBV cases are attributable to general
dentists. A slightly higher percentage, 1.5%, are attributable to oral surgeons. Hepatitis B and
Dental Personnel, supra note 28, at 220. The actual percentage may be higher since many individ-
uals with HBV demonstrate no overt symptoms. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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transmissions, supports the position that there exists cause for alarm.33
Prevention and control measures available to reduce the risk, therefore,
presents an important issue.
Accurate identification of HBV carriers enables dentists to protect
themselves from the disease.34 Currently the dental profession suggests
three methods: medical histories;35 identification of HBV high risk
groups; 36 and serological testing.37
Most dentists obtain a medical history of a prospective patient before
initiating doctor-patient contact.38 These histories include direct ques-
tions concerning past hepatitis infection, and general questions regard-
ing whether the patient ever had a blood transfusion or renal dialysis.39
Unfortunately medical histories present an ineffective means for diag-
nosing hepatitis. First, those patients who respond positively about
past hepatitis infection often do not know which hepatitis they con-
tracted.' ° Second, because of the high incidence of nonclinical HBV
infections, many potential carriers respond negatively to such
33. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
34. If dentists could distinguish carriers from noncarriers, they could take special precautions
with respect to those patients whom they identified as carriers. In theory such precautions would
reduce to nearly zero the risk of transmitting the disease. Dentists cannot contract the disease
from noncarrier patients. In turn, if the dentist remains free from HBV he cannot transmit the
disease to patients. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 31, at 182-85. For a discussion of the various
prevention and control measures available, see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
35. See Goebel, supra note 22, at 907-13; Smith, supra note 10, at 205. See also infra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
36. Those groups with the highest incidence rate of HBV constitute the high risk groups. For
discussion of these groups, see infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
37. Serological testing entails screening individuals for the presence of the HBV surface anti-
gen (HBsAg) in their serum. The presence of persistent HBsAg and HB0 Ab indicates carrier
status. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the cost-effectiveness of
serological testing, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
38. Alexandersupra note 31, at 184; Goebel, supra note 22, at 907-13. The American Dental
Association (ADA) currently recommends that dentists take thorough medical histories of all new
patients. See Infection Control, supra note 23, at 675 (1975).
39. Doctors have designed indirect questions to identify those individuals who are members
of high risk groups. See Council on Dental Therapeutics, Report of Councils andBureaus, Type B
(serum) Hepatitis and Dental Practice, 92 J.A.D.A. 153, 155 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Report of
Councils]. For a discussion of those groups considered high risk, see infra notes 42-44 and accom-
panying text.
40. One expert recently conducted a study to determine the effectiveness of medical histories.
Of the 25 patients reporting a past history of HBV, only 14 had serologic evidence of past infec-
tion. In addition, 58 of the 140 individuals tested with serologic evidence of past HBV infection,
31 percent had hepatitis type A (HAY). Forty-five percent gave a nonspecific or unknown history.
Only 24% identified themselves correctly. See Goebel, supra note 22, at 908-12.
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questionnaires.4 '
Identification of high risk groups can alert the dentist to take special
precautions when treating particular patients. High risk groups include
renal dialysis patients, patients institutionalized for mental retardation,
patients with malignancy treated with frequent transfusions and im-
muno-suppressive drugs, patients, such as hemophiliacs, who receive
blood and blood derivative in large volumes, percutaneous drug abus-
ers, and male homosexuals.42 The same defects inherent in the reliance
on medical histories, however, are again present. Only a small number
of individuals in the group identified will in fact be HBV carriers.
Meanwhile, the dentist remains unprotected against the potential HBV
carriers not so identified.43 While some dentists employ special pre-
ventative measures when working with high risk patients and other
dentists refuse to treat them, such conduct is not an established stan-
dard of care.'
Serological testing45 for the HBV antigen is now 99.4 percent accu-
rate.46 In a technical sense, therefore, it is possible to pre-screen pa-
tients to identify carriers. In addition, dental personnel can subject
41. As noted, see supra note 40, 45 percent of individuals serologically positive for HBAg
gave no history of past HBV infection. See Goebel, supra note 22, at 909.
42. The mode of transmission of HBV makes these groups high risk. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text. For instance many percutaneous drug abusers share needles. Because it
takes only microscopic amounts of infected blood to transfer the disease, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text, such a practice enhances the spread of HBV. In fact, the reported incidence
rate among drug abusers is 45%. See Watkins, Viral Hepatitis B: A Special Problem ofPrevention,
6 J. Am. Soc'Y PREVENTATIVE DENTISTRY 8, 10 (May-June 1976). Researchers found that homo-
sexuals constitute a high risk group because their semen is positive for HBV antigen almost 50% of
the time. See Withers, supra note 31, at 164. For a general discussion of the high risk groups
cited, see Alexander, supra note 31, at 183; Ferry, Guidelinesfor the Prevention ofHepatitis Trans-
mission in Dental Offices, AM. LIVER FOUND. PUBLICATION 4 (1975); Ross & Clarke, Hepatitis B in
Dentistry The Current Position, 150 BRIT. DENTAL J. 89, 90 (1981); Report of Councils, supra note
39, at 145; Shields, supra note 31, at 180.
43. This exposure exists because a large number of HBV victims never exhibit clinical symp-
toms. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44. Studies prove that some dentists discriminate between those patients who are and those
who are not members of high risk groups. This practice is not widespread. See Shields, supra
note 31, at 180-81. While the dental profession encourages dentists to employ special precautions
such as the use of gloves and masks, see infra note 51 and accompanying text, the profession does
not recommend that dentists refuse to treat members of high risk groups. Refusal of treatment
may cause members of high risk groups to lie on future medical histories, which will in turn
prevent other dentists from taking the proper precautions. See Report ofCouncils, supra note 39,
at 156-57.
45. See supra note 37.
46. Until a few years ago, serological testing was only 30% accurate. Abbott Laboratories,
Number 2]
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themselves to periodic testing. Cost and time consumption, however,
militate against this alternative becoming a valuable method of HBV
prevention.47 In addition, the American Dental Association (ADA)
stated that it did not recommend routine serological testing at this
time.48
As a result of the problems discussed above, most of the existing
medical literature recommends treating each patient as if he were a
potential carrier.49 Generally, experts propose the use of thorough
medical histories, hand cleansing with antimicrobial soap, the employ-
ment of protective glasses, disposable masks and rubber gloves, and the
proper autoclaving50 of instruments.5' Case studies indicate that the
however, recently developed Radioimmune Assay (RIA) which is 99.4% accurate in detecting
HBV antigen. See Letters to the Editors, 102 J.A.D.A. 612 (1981).
47. The value of serological testing is twofold. First, it enables the dentist to identify accu-
rately HBV carriers, and thus take appropriate measures to prevent patient-dentist transmission.
Second, as a safety measure, the dentist can routinely test himself to see if he is a carrier capable of
transmitting HBV to patients. All medical literature agrees, however, that the prohibitive cost and
time involved in testing each patient outweighs the benefits of such testing. This conclusion is
correct because of simpler, less expensive and less time consuming alternatives. See Alexander,
supra note 3 1, at 183. For a discussion of these alternatives, see infra notes 51-55 and accompany-
ing text.
48. According to the Council on Dental Therapeutics of the ADA:
Routine serological testing of dental personnel is not recommended at this time, and
anyone who is asked to be tested should be permitted to decline without any adverse
action or censure. However, it is extremely important to assess fully the risks in various
groups and, therefore, testing in an investigative situation, such as a survey, in which
anonymity can be maintained is encouraged.
Report of Councils, supra note 39, at 155. In addition, the Committee on Viral Hepatitis of the
National Academy of Sciences also stated that routine antigen testing of "any specific professional
group, or imposition of any restrictions on individuals' activities because of antigen-positivity, is
not indicated or recommended." Alexander, supra note 31, at 184.
49. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 31, at 185; Smith supra note 10, at 204-05; Threat of
Hepatits, supra note 31, at 216.
50. The autoclave is "I. [a]n apparatus for sterilization by steam under pressure; it consists
of a strong closed boiler containing a small quantity of water and, in a wire basket, the articles to
be sterilized. 2. v. To sterilize in an autoclave." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 143 (23d ed.
1976).
51. The following quotation represents the proposed clinical guidelines in more detail:
CLINICAL GUIDELINES
1. Every patient should have a thorough medical history taken before dental treat-
ment of any kind. Patients should be initially observed for obvious outward suggestions
of disease (yellow eyes or needle marks on the arms).
2. Hands should be washed before all patient seatings, using an effective antimicro-
bial soap and scrub brush.
3. All personnel working chairside should wear protective glasses, disposable masks,
and disposable rubber gloves for all treatment; the minimal expense and inconvenience
is far outweighed by the consequences of not taking these precautions. Phones, doors,
cabinets, and lights should not be touched with contaminated gloves, unless protected or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/4
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combination of these four proposals, particularly the employment of
protective devices, reduces the risk of dentist-patient transmission.52
Oral surgeons currently incorporate all four of the above proposals
in their standard of care. General dentists, however, do not as a rule
shielded in some fashion. If waterspray handpieces are used, personnel should use high-
speed suctions and work with rubber dams in place.
4. All waste containers should be lined with high-quality, sealable plastic bags, so
debris and waste can be safely disposed of, and the safety of all who handle the refuse
can be assured. Needles and knifeblades should not be placed in such bags, where pene-
tration might occur, but disposed of separately.
5. Auxiliary personnel should handle used instruments and burs only with gloved
hands before cleaning and sterilization, to avoid inoculating the skin with blood-soaked
debris. Precautions should be taken at all times to assure that the soft tissues are not cut,
nicked, or inoculated with anything that has contacted the patient's blood or saliva.
6. All autoclavable instruments should be scrubbed free of blood and debris after
each use (as described), then autoclaved. No instruments should be carried over from
one patient to the next without decontamination. Hand-pieces, light handles, buttons,
chairs, and sinks should be wiped for at least 15 to 30 seconds with gluteraldehyde or
bleach solution, using protective rubber gloves. Equipment must be subsequently rinsed
or wiped to remove the potentially irritating residual solution. The longer the viricidal
solution can remain on the equipment, the more effective the protection will be.
7. Air/water syringes and handpiece suction lines should be periodically flushed out
with a viricidal or bleach solution, as described.
8. If any patient shows outward indications of disease (icteric eyes or flu symptoms
with abdominal pain), the patient should be referred for medical evaluation before treat-
ment. Patients identified as having acute hepatitis should receive emergency treatment
only, with great precautions taken to minimize office and equipment contamination, and
prevent inoculation of the treating professionals. Linen should be placed in specially
marked bags for protection of the laundry personnel. Refuse should be handled as de-
scribed. After the acute phase has passed, the patient can then be handled in the same
manner as a chronic carrier.
9. If a dentist or auxiliary becomes antigen-positive but has no signs of active dis-
ease, careful medical follow-up and guidance are essential, but there should not be over
concern. The Committee on Viral Hepatitis of the National Academy of Sciences issued
a statement in 1972 (which was reaffirmed in 1974) that remains valid today-routine
antigen testing of any specific professional group, or imposition of any restrictions on
individuals' activities because of antigen-positivity, is not indicated or recommended.
Alexander, supra note 31, at 185. For similar proposals, see, e.g., Crawford, supra note 29, at 734;
Ellen, The Dental Practitioner and Systematic Infections of Oral Origin, 28 INT'L DENTAL J. 295,
302-03 (1978); Threat ofHepatitis, supra note 31, at 216.
In 1976, the Council of Dental Therapeutics of the ADA made recommendations. Unlike most
proposals, the ADA recommended the use of gloves only during surgical procedures likely to
induce bleeding. The ADA did not advise general dentists to wear gloves. See Report of Councils,
supra note 39, at 157.
52. Case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of gloves in eliminating the risk of dentist-
patient transmission. Several studies document that dentists and oral surgeons who transmitted
HBV to their patients no longer did so after employing disposable rubber gloves in their practice.
See Hepatitis B and Dental Personnel, supra note 28, at 220-21 (author discusses three case histo-
nes involving dentists transmitting HBV to patients; after dentists used gloves, no new cases of
HBV discovered). But see Goodwin, Fannin & McCracken, supra note 28, at 304 (study indicates
that patients seen after carrier dentist began wearing gloves developed HBV; upon removal, seem-
mgly undamaged gloves contained multiple microscopic leaks).
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wear protective glasses, or disposable masks and rubber gloves.53 The
Council on Dental Therapeutics of the ADA currently only recom-
mends wearing such devices during oral surgery procedures.5 4 This po-
sition contravenes the weight of existing authority, both in the United
States and abroad, which recommends wearing gloves during all
procedures. 5
III. CASE LAW-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAUSES OF ACTION
Three basic theories, negligence, informed consent and res ipsa lo-
quitur, provide the foundation for medical malpractice claims.56
A4. Negligence----a deviation from the standard of care
The standard of care not only denotes the degree of skill and knowl-
edge possessed by the medical profession, 57 but also establishes the pa-
rameters of acceptable medical conduct. 8  While the medical
53. A survey of 1,200 dentists revealed that only 20% reported taking precautions against
hepatitis. Moreover, 13% relied on masks and only six percent reported using gloves. Eighty
percent of all oral surgeons surveyed reported wearing gloves and taking other precautions during
most procedures. See Feldman & Schiff, supra note 26, at 1228; Infection in Dentists, supra note 26
at 732; Smith, supra note 10, at 204-05; Watkins, supra note 42, at 9 & 12.
It is a well established standard of care, however, for dentists who are known carriers to wear
gloves. In fact, local health authorities usually mandate the precaution in such circumstances.
See Goodman, Ahtone & Finton, Hepatitis Bf. Transmission from Dental Personnel to Patients:
Unfinished Business, 96 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 119 (1982); Hadler, supra note 28, at 138.
54. See Report of Councils, supra note 39, at 157. See also supra note 51.
55. See supra note 51. See also Hadler, supra note 28, at 138.
56. Other theories also may provide the basis for a medical malpractice claim. These theo-
ries include, breach of contract or warranty, abandonment, assault and battery, false imprison-
ment, wrongful commitment, and abuse of process. Negligence, informed consent and res ipsa
loquitur, however, provide the most frequent basis for malpractice suits. See 2 D. LOUISELL & H.
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 502-04 (1973); Santar & Pataki, Medical Maractice:
Causes ofAction, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 1311 (1980).
57. Negligence law requires the existence of some real or presumed standard against which
courts may compare behavior. Ordinarily courts use the standard of the "reasonable man." That
standard represents the minimum of acceptable conduct. Courts demand a higher standard, how-
ever, from individuals possessing special skill and knowledge. The rationale for this additional
requirement is the public's expectations and reliance. Thus, courts hold physicians, surgeons and
dentists to a degree of care ordinarily possessed by competent men in their field. See, e.g., Pike v.
Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th
ed. 1971); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959).
58. The standards governing the duty of skill and care of physicians fully apply to dentists.
See McTyeire v. McGaughy, 222 Ala. 100, 130 So. 784 (1930); Black v. Bearden, 167 Ark, 455,
268 S.W. 27 (1925); Hurley v. Johnston, 143 Conn. 364, 122 A.2d 732 (1956); Tanner v. Sanders,
247 Ky. 90, 56 S.W.2d 718 (1933); Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co., 300 Mass. 223, 15 N.E.2d
185 (1938); Newport v. Hyde, 244 Miss. 870, 147 So.2d 113 (1962); Grandy v. Merchant, 127 Neb.
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community generally sets these standards,59 the courts define the pa-
rameters and determine to which physicians the standards apply.
The earliest standard courts enunciated in the United States was the
strict locality rule,6" which required the physician and surgeon to exer-
cise that degree of skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by others
of the same locality.6' The disparity between the overall educational
opportunities available in the large cities and those available in the
smaller towns provide the basis for the rule.62
Courts soon objected to the strict locality rule because small town
physicians became immune from suit by adhering to a lower standard
of care63 and because the conspiracy of silence precluded testimony. 64
696, 256 N.W. 636 (1934); Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D. 416, 217 N.W. 666 (1928); Hill v. Parker,
12 Wash. 2d 517, 122 P.2d 476 (1942).
59. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
60. One of the earliest cases was Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880). The plaintiff con-
sulted the defendant, a general practitioner in a small town of 2500, for treatment of a severe
wound that required a considerable degree of surgical skill. The court stated that it was common
knowledge that a physician from a small country village did not have frequent opportunities to
perform difficult operations. Therefore, the court could not hold him to the same standard as a
physician in a large city. The court held that the level ofskill and knowledge ordinarily possessed
in the locality in which the defendant practiced governed his conduct. Id. at 133. See also Mar-
chlewski v. Casella, 141 Conn. 377, 106 A.2d 466 (1954); Smothers v. Hank, 34 Iowa 286 (1972);
Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870); Hathorn v. Richmond, 458 Vt. 557 (1876).
61. See cases cited supra note 60. England never adopted the locality rule. Commentators
suggest that this disparity results from the difference in the size of the two countries. See Waltz,
The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DE PAUL L.
Rlv. 408, 410 (1969).
62. Courts developed the rule to protect the rural and small town practitioner, whom the
public perceived to be less adequately informed and equipped than those physicians from urban
areas. According to the court in Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870):
, In the smaller towns and country, those who practice medicine and surgery, though
often possessing a thorough theoretical knowledge of the highest elements of the profes-
sion, do not enjoy so great opportunities of daily observation and practical operations,
where the elementary studies are brought into every day use, as those who reside in the
metropolitan towns, and though just as well informed in the elements and literature of
their profession, they should not be expected to exercise that high degree of skill and
practical knowledge possessed by those having greater facilities for performing and wit-
nessing operations, and who are, or may be constantly observing the various accidents
and forms of disease.
Id. at 63-64.
63. See Waltz, supra note 61, at 411. ("[hie could be treating bone fractures with grape
leaves and yet remain beyond the criticism of more enlightened practitioners from other commu-
nities.") Id. For a general criticism of the locality rule, see Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Hospital Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1945); Brun v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d
793 (1968).
64. The conspiracy of silence refers to a situation in which experts will not testify against
other members of their profession. In many instances, it effectively precludes the plaintiff from
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A third criticism, however, finally influenced a shift towards a more
uniform standard. Technological advances in society, such as in-
creased mobility, caused a narrowing of the disparity in medical oppor-
tunities between rural and urban doctors. Therefore, these advances
obviated the need for different standards in different communities. 65
Notwithstanding the strong trend to abrogate the strict locality rule,
a few jurisdictions retain it for two reasons.66 First, courts assert that
while the medical profession should strive for a national standard of
care, courts should refrain from imposing the standard.67 Second, be-
cause the locality rule became well entrenched in the existing malprac-
tice law, a change in a fundamental principle falls within the domain of
the legislature and not the courts.68
This perceived attitudinal change failed to signal the complete aban-
donment of the locality rule. The majority of jurisdictions adopted a
modified locality rule rather than a national standard per se.69 The
acquiring the necessary expert testimony. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
Physicians are even more reluctant to testify against a fellow medical professional in a small
community. Since the strict locality rule applied only to experts from the same community, it
made finding an expert an often insurmountable burden for the plaintiff. See Comment, Medical
Ma/practice-The 'ocalityRule"andithe "Conspiracy of Silence," 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 810,
810-13 (1970).
65. Courts cite as factors vastly superior post-graduate training, the impact of modem com-
munication and transportation, the proliferation of medical literature, frequent seminars and vari-
ous other continuing educational classes, availability of modem clinical facilities, and
nationalization of medical school curricula. See, e.g., Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970);
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269,
206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945 (1976). See also infra notes
72-73 and accompanying text.
67. The court in Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945 (1976) stated that courts
should not judicially impose a standard of care. The court did not accept the nationalized nature
of medicine and did not agree that a national standard of care was applicable. The court argued
that if the medical profession adopted a "national standard," it would be irrelevant that the court
applied the "locality rule" because the standard adopted in the locality would be the same ad-
hered to nationally. Id. at 770, 531 S.W.2d at 948. The court also stated that it remained uncon-
vinced that small town doctors had the same opportunities as doctors from urban areas. The court
cited as reasons the demanding practice of small town physicians, which makes it difficult for
them to attend seminars and regional medical meetings, and the small town doctor's lack of con-
tinued exposure to those who have been trained or have developed expertise in the use of new
skills. Id. at 769-70, 534 S.W.2d at 948.
68. Id. at 770-A, 531 S.W.2d at 949.
69. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. The modified locality rule applies only to
general practitioners. Courts hold specialists to a "national standard." See, e.g., Simpson v. Da-
vis, 219 Kan. 284, 549 P.2d 950 (1976). Cf. Naccaroto v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788
(1970) (court adopted a per se national standard test).
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most common formulations require physicians to exercise that degree
of care possessed by others in similar localities,' ° the same or similar
communities," and similar and readily accessible communities.' 2
No matter which rule a jurisdiction adopts, courts generally agree
that the medical profession must establish the standards governing
medical conduct. 3 The Washington Supreme Court in Helling v. Ca-
rey, 4 however, held that adherence to community standards does not
insulate a physician from liability."5 The court stated that the proper
standard of care is that which reasonable prudence dictates in light of
the skill and knowledge possessed by the profession. 6 Subsequent
cases failed to follow Helling." As in any other negligence claim, all
70. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949) (same "locality" or "vicinity");
McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950) (like "localities"); Mecham v.
McLeay, 193 Neb. 457, 227 N.W.2d 829 (1975) (similar "community").
71. See. e.g.. Karrigan v. Nazareth Convent & Academy, Inc., 212 Kan. 44, 510 P.2d 190
(1973) (community where he practices or similar community); Runyon v. Reed, 510 P.2d 943
(Okla. 1973) (same or similar communities); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971)
(same or similar locality or community).
72. Courts base this information on the idea that if a small rural community lies a short
distance from an urban area, its physicians have the same access to information and further train-
ing as their city counterparts do. See, e.g, Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 73, 431 P.2d 973
(1967). The court stated that the "standard of care is that established in an area coextensive with
the medical and professional means available in those centers that are readily accessible for ap-
propriate treatment of patient." Id. at 79, 431 P.2d at 978.
73. No matter which formulation a jurisdiction adopts, the locality rule or some modification
thereof, the custom of the reasonable medical practitioner governs the scope of acceptable behav-
ior. See. e.g.. Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 I. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82
(Maine 1974). A custom may be inherently unacceptable, however, because of changing methods
and knowledge or because of unreasonableness. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community
Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
74. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). A 32 year old patient lost her peripheral vision
because of undiagnosed glaucoma. The doctor did not detect this condition because the standard
practice of ophthalmologists did not include a routine test for the disease until the patient was
over forty.
75. The court held the ophthalmologist liable for damages to the patient's eye. In so holding
the court stated:
In most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never
its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and avail-
able devices. It may never set its own test no matter how persuasive its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required- there are precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983, (citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932)).
76, The court stated that reasonable prudence dictates the administration of glaucoma tests
to all patients. Such tests are simple and inexpensive, and the benefits of employing them far
outweighs the burden placed on physicians. Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
77. This case failed to foster any line of progency, and the Washington state legislature at-
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jurisdictions require the plaintiff to prove proximate cause.78
B. Informed consent
Judge Cardozo in Schlendorffv. Society of New York Hospital79 pro-
vided the foundation of modem informed consent doctrine when he
said that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has the
right to determine what shall be done with his own body .. ."80 Gen-
erally, consent requires that the patient receive all relevant information
concerning the risks and possible alternatives of a proposed proce-
dure."t If the patient lacks knowledge and one of the unfortunate risks
tempted to overrule it. The legislature enacted WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (West Supp,
1983-84), which states in pertinent part:
4.24.290 Action for damages based on professional negligence of hospitals or mem-
bers of healing arts-Standard of proof-Evidence-Exception. . . the plaintiffin order
to prevail shall be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant or defendants failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by
other persons in the same profession and that as a proximate result of such failure the
plaintiff suffered damages, but in no event shall the provisions of this section apply to an
action based on the failure to obtain the informed consent of a patient. [Added by Laws
1st Ex Sess 1975 ch. 35 § I.]
Id (emphasis added). This attempt, however, failed. In the later case of Gates v. Jensen, 92
Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979), the court interpreted "possessed" as that degree of knowledge
"possessed" albeit not currently exercised by the profession. The court stated that ophthalmolo-
gists possess the skill and learning necessary to administer the glaucoma test. If the test's benefits
outweigh the burden on the profession, that the test is not an adopted standard of care is immate-
rial. Id at 242, 595 P.2d at 924. See generally Note, Physicians and Surgeons-Malpractice- Court
Disregardfor the Standard of the Profession-The Legislative Response-Hellng v. Carey, 51 WASH.
L. REv. 167 (1975).
78. To satisfy the element of proximate cause the plaintiff must prove that the harm suffered
resulted directly from the deviation from the accepted standard of care. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971); Danner & Sagall, Medicolegal Causation: A Source of Professional
Misunderstanding, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 303 (1977).
79. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
80. Id at 129, 105 N.E.2d at 93.
81. For a discussion of the case law, see infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know, 40 INS. CouNs. J. 580 (1973) (discussing
history, development, and content of the informed consent doctrine); Comment, Informed Consent.-
A Malpractice Headache, 47 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 242 (1970) (analysing the physician's legal duty
under the informed consent doctrine).
Many states have enacted statutes dealing with informed consent. One type of statute is eviden-
tiary in nature, listing the information physicians must disclose concerning the proposed course of
treatment. Further, these statutes generally require that all patients or their guardians sign a
consent form. If the doctor meets these requirements, courts treat this as prima facie evidence that
the doctor provided informed consent. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 147.137 (West Supp. 1983-84).
The Department of Health Education and Welfare also proposed some guidelines for disclosure.
Victor, Informed Consent, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 138, 162 (1981).
The second group of statutes uses the "cause of action" approach. These statutes list the ele-
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results from treatment, the physician may be liable for the consequent
injuries.8 2
The informed consent requirement forced courts to develop stan-
dards governing the scope of disclosure. Currently, courts apply one of
two competing formulations: the older rule or the "medical" stan-
dard 3 and the modem trend or the "material risk" standard.84
Pursuant to the "medical standard" doctrine, courts defer to the
judgment of the medical community. 5 The information that the rea-
sonably prudent medical practitioner would disclose to a patient of or-
dinary understanding under the same or similar circumstances
encompasses the scope of disclosure. 86 Because this scope depends on
the standards of the medical community, expert testimony becomes es-
sential to determine if the physician properly discharged his
obligation. 7
ments necessary for a cause of action based on lack of informed consent. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-562(b) (West 1982). See generally Victor, supra, at 159-61.
82. This example represents the negligence formulation of the informed consent doctrine.
The physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one because the physician occupies a place of
confidence and trust. Eg., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Allison v. Blewett, 348 S.W.2d 182
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Thus, the physician has an obligation to disclose to his patient information
concerning the proposed treatment. For discussion of this disclosure, see infra notes 84-100 and
accompanying text. The physician is negligent of this obligation is not discharged and an undis-
closed risk results from treatment. See Beloud, The Growing Importance ofInformed Consent, 8
LINCOLN L. REV. 115 (1973); Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970
Wis. L. REV. 879.
Another cause of action falls within the informed consent doctrine-the unauthorized treatment
or the "battery" formulation. This situation arises when the patient assents to one operation and
the physician performs another. See, e.g, Kennedy v. Parrot, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956)
(patient entered hospital to have her appendix removed but physician removed ovarian cysts in-
stead). See generally Note, Advise and Consent in Medicine: .4 Look at the Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 16 N.Y. L. F. 863 (1970) (discussing the origin of informed consent battery actions). The
battery formulation lies beyond the scope of this Note.
83. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
86. This example illustrates the earliest physician disclosure requirement. Generally, courts
provided two rationales for this rule. First, the complexity of medical care puts the medical pro-
fessions in the best position to assess what risks merit disclosure. Second, the rule provides a
certainty to the physician concerning what he must disclose. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 ("Itlhe duty of a physician to disclose. . . is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make in the same or similar
circumstance").
87. Courts require expert testimony to establish the proper scope of disclosure within the
medical community. Courts must refer to the law of the state in question to determine whether it
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The medical standard doctrine has many critics. Courts state that
the conspiracy of silence renders the rule ineffective.88 Further, courts
assert that patients rely on their physicians for aid in making the cor-
rect decision. Hence, the doctrine of informed consent demands that
doctors apprise their patients of all material risks.8 9 In response to
these arguments, courts developed the "material risk" standard.9°
According to this test, the standards of the medical community do
not delineate the scope of disclosure. Rather, the patient's right to self-
determination forms the basis for this test.9' The test requires the phy-
sician to disclose to the patient all the facts that are material to the
patient's ability to make an informed, intelligent decision.92 The mate-
riality of a risk depends on whether a reasonable person would attach
significance to the risk, if disclosed, in deciding whether to opt for the
proposed therapy. 93 Courts consistently require three types of disclo-
sures. Patients need to know the inherent risks and potential hazards
adopts a "locality" or "national" standard of care for its physicians. See supra notes 60-79 and
accompanying text. See generally Martin v. Bralliar, 36 Colo. App. 254, 540 P.2d 1118 (1975)
(plaintiff has burden to prove nondisclosure of certain risk; once established, burden shifts to
physician to produce expert testimony that he acted within the standard of care); Hunter v. Brown,
4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971) (an exception to the expert testimony rule when the
disclosure becomes so obvious that the layman knows that the physician did not adhere to profes-
sional standards).
88. Because expert testimony is crucial to a plaintiff's claim, the conspiracy of silence can
thwart the plaintiff's ability to bring a successful suit. See supra note 64. In fact, failure to pro-
duce expert testimony often results in either a dismissal or directed verdict for the plaintiff. See,
e.g., Green v. Hussey, 127 II. App. 2d 174, 262 N.E.2d 156 (1970); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421
(Wyo. 1962).
89. This appraisal becomes very important in light of the disparity of medical knowledge
between the physician and the average patient. The patient has no way of knowing if his doctor
disclosed all the risks to him. He must rely on his physician. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Sand v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). See also
Comment, Recent Uses and MLses ofthe Informed Consent Doctrine, 10 FORUM 383 (1974) (criti-
cizing the medical standard model of informed consent).
90. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
91. Courts argue that the physician should not decide what the patient needs to know. That
determination rests with the patient because he must live with the ill effects, if any, that result
from surgery. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1973); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Goodwin v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 294 So.2d 618 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d
1014 (1977); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
92. See cases cited supra note 92. See also infra note 94 and accompanying text.
93. See cases cited supra note 92. The court in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1973) stated that " ..all risks potentially affecting the decision
must be unmasked. And to safeguard the patient's interest in achieving his own determination on
treatment the law must itself set the standard for disclosure." Id. at 787. See generally Waltz &
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of proposed treatment, the alternatives to proposed treatment, and the
likely results if the patient remains untreated. 94
Though generally stated in terms of full disclosure, even the "mate-
rial risk" standard is not absolute. Courts recognize nondisclosure for
many reasons, including therapeutic grounds,95 incapacity of the pa-
tient, remote risks inherent in common procedures, risks already
known to the patient, risks not known to the physician, or the patient's
desire to remain uninformed.96
The modern material risk doctrine, however, has its critics. Some
courts suggest that no test can distinguish a material from a nonmate-
rial risk.97 This impasse suggests that courts should defer to the custom
of the medical profession.98 Other critics state that the patient's best
interest and not the physician's need to protect himself from potential
lawsuits should govern disclosure. 99 Finally, other courts assert that the
Sheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628, 630, 631 (1970) (articulating the
"material risk" formulation).
94. Although courts consistently require three types of disclosure, they have yet to state con-
sistently the point at which the risk becomes inherent to the proposed treatment. For instance, the
court in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) distinguished be-
tween common and complicated procedures. Complicated procedures require full disclosure of
all risks, even the remote risks. Simple procedures, such as blood tests, do not require disclosure
of risks with a low incidence. The court in Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909
(1970) did not distinguish between types of procedure. Rather, the court required disclosure for
all treatments if the risk is significant. Id. at 313, 474 P.2d at 919.
95. Nondisclosure for therapeutic reasons refers to a physician's discretion to withhold cer-
tain information, if, in his judgment, disclosure of such facts would hinder his patient's recovery.
See cases cited supra note 92.
96, See cases cited supra note 92. All courts agree that in an emergency situation they will
waive the informed consent requirement. For example, an emergency occurs when the patient is
unconscious.
97. See, e.g., Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975). See also infra note
99 and accompanying text.
98. Because there is no sharp distinction between a significant and an insignificant risk, a rule
that requires sharp delineation becomes imprecise. If, however, courts defer to the judgment of
the medical profession about the reasonableness of disclosure, a consistent standard will develop.
See, e.g., ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
99. The court in Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975) stated:
To adopt the minority rule of Canterbury would result in requiring every doctor to
spend much unnecessary time in going over with every patient every possible effect of
any proposed treatment. The doctor should not have to practice his profession with the
knowledge that every consultation with every patient with respect to future treatment
contains a potential lawsuit and his advice and suggestions must necessarily be phrased
with the possible defense of a lawsuit in mind. This would necessarily result in the doc-
tor's inability to give the best interest of his patient primary importance.
Id at 342, 213 S.E.2d at 581-82.
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material risk standard places too severe a burden on the physician.'°°
Under either doctrine the patient must satisfy the element of proxi-
mate cause by proving that but for the nondisclosure, the patient would
not have given his consent. t0' In most jurisdictions, the patient must
satisfy the objective test that a reasonable man would have not con-
sented to the procedure if he knew of the undisclosed risk. 02 Some
jurisdictions that adopt the material risk test employ a subjective stan-
dard'013 requiring that the particular patient would have foregone the
procedure if he knew of the risks.t "n
C Res Ipsa Loquitur
When a plaintiff asserts a claim of negligence against his physician,
courts require expert testimony to prove that the physician deviated
from acceptable medical practice. 05 This prerequisite represents an
undue burden for the plaintiff when the defendant controls the cause of
100. See generally Victor, supra note 82 at 144-49.
101. See Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965). According to the Shetter
court:
Under malpractice theories, there would be no damage proximately resulting from the
failure to disclose unless the plaintiff would not have had the operation if the disclosures
had been made.
... This is an application of the fundamental 'but for' rule, which comes as close to
being of the essence of the proximate cause doctrine as any concept.
Id. at 367, 409 P.2d at 83.
102. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Ozzi, Survey
of the Law of Informed Consent in Physician-Patient Relationships, LEGAL MED. 117 (C. Wecht ed.
1982). The author stated in support of the objective standard:
It is questionable whether a patient can honestly say that had all the risks been disclosed
to him before treatment he would have declined. Generally speaking it is safe to specu-
late that when a patient selects a physician and places confidence in him, the patient will
submit to those procedures recommended by the doctor. But at trial the patient-plaintiff
will certainly testify that 'had I known of the risk, I never would have consented.' The
jury may, wellagree.
Id at 120-21.
103. See, e.g., Pulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606,
295 A.2d 676 (1972).
104. See cases cited supra note 104.
105. Plaintiffs base negligence claims on a deviation from the accepted standard of care, See
supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text. Thus, courts require expert testimony to determine the
standard and the behavior within the scope of negligence. See, e.g., Brown v. Com, 11 Cal. 3d
639, 522 P.2d 688, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1974); Simpson v. Davis, 219 Kan. 584, 549 P.2d 950 (1976);
Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775 (Ky. 1965). See also W. MORlus, DENTAL LITMATION 60 (2d
ed. 1977) (arguing that because the jury consists of laymen, they are not ordinarily competent
without the aid of expert testimony to determine whether the dentist exercised the required skill in
treating a patient).
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the harm. 06 In such instances, plaintiffs invoke res ipsa loquitur.'t 7
It is not sufficient that negligence occurs. A plaintiff must satisfy the
three basic elements of a res ipsa loquitur claim. The plaintiff must
prove first, that this type of accident does not occur in the absence of
negligence; second, that an agency or instrumentality within the de-
fendant's exclusive control caused the injuries; and third, that the
plaintiff did not contribute to the injury.108
The first element is the most difficult to satisfy. Courts refuse to ap-
ply res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases unless, from common
experience and comprehension, the layperson can deduce that the in-
jury that resulted from the treatment ordinarily would not occur. 10 9
The matter under investigation must be so simple and the result so
wrong that a juror can infer negligence without the aid of an expert."10
Pursuant to this requirement, courts distinguish between diagnosis
and scientific treatment to which res ipsa is inapplicable and cases in
which some act or omission occurs that does not require expert testi-
mony."' For instance, courts do not apply res ipsa loquitur to cases
involving mistaken diagnosis," 2  unsuccessful- treatment,"13  wrong
106. See generally Comment, Res 1psa Loquitur: A Casefor Flexibility in Medical Malpractice,
16 WAYNE L. REv. 1136 (1970) (discussing the general principles underlying res ipsa loquitur).
107. More affectionately known as "somebody obviously goofed," R. MORRIs & A. MORITZ,
DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 403 (5th ed. 1971), the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
originated in 1863 in the English case of Byrne v. Boadle. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). In that case,
a barrel inexplicably fell from a loft and injured a pedestrian. The court held that the barrel
failing under these circumstances presented prima facie evidence of negligence. Because the
plaintiff could not ascertain the negligence, the court decided not to place that unfair burden on
him. As a result, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove the existence of any facts inconsis-
tent with negligence. Id. at 301.
108. See, e.g, Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 242 N.W.2d 594 (1976);
Homer v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n Hospitals, Inc. 62 Wash. 2d 351, 382 P.2d 518 (1963).
109. The plaintiff must show more than a mere rarity. See, e.g., Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d
609 (Iowa 1973). The jury must be able to infer that, more likely than not, the injury resulted
from the defendant's negligence. See, e.g., Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton, 169 Mont.
185, 545 P.2d 670 (1976). See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Brown v. Keaveny, 326 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The court stated, "[t]he thing
does not speak for itself unless a layman can say as a matter of common knowledge that the
consequences of the professional treatment are not those which ordinarily occur if due care has
been exercised." Id at 661. See also Lambert v. Soltis, 422 Pa. 304, 221 A.2d 173 (1966).
111. Scientific treatment and diagnosis cases fall outside the common knowledge and experi-
ence of laymen. Courts require expert testimony and refuse to apply res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g.,
Whetstine v. Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 291 N.W. 425 (1940). See Arthur, Res Ipsa Loquitur as
Applied in Dental Cases, 15 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 220 (1943). See also infra notes 113-16 and
accompanying text.
112. See. e.g., Carraway v. Graham, 218 Ala. 453, 118 So. 807 (1928) (surgery for presumed
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choice of treatment,1" 4 or injuries resulting from a known risk of treat-
ment.' 15  On the other hand, courts apply res ipsa loquitur to cases
involving foreign objects left inside a patient after a surgical proce-
dure," 6 injury to a healthy part of the body unrelated to the part un-
dergoing medical treatment," 7 surgery on or removal of the wrong part
of the body," 8 and extracted teeth mistakenly dropped into the pa-
tient's windpipe." 9 Courts caution, however, that even if res ipsa lo-
quitur applies, it creates only a rebuttable presumption of
negligence. 20
Some courts criticize the application of res ipsa loquitur to malprac-
tice claims because they recognize the purely theoretical nature of the
rebuttable presumption. These courts assert that res ipsa loquitur often
results in the liability of a physician without fault because of the occur-
appendicitis); Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938) ("fixation screw" in ankle bone
mistaken for sprain); Patterson v. Marcus, 203 Cal. 550, 265 P. 222 (1928) (ovarian cyst mistaken
for pregnancy).
113. See, e.g., Adams v. Boyce, 37 Cal. App, 2d 541, 99 P.2d 1044 (1940) (failure to remove
foreign bodies from eye); Houghton v. Dickson, 29 Cal. App. 321, 155 P. 128 (1916) (failure to
correct fracture); Bettigole v. Diener, 210 Md. 537, 124 A.2d 265 (1956) (facial paralysis following
mastoidectomy).
114. See, e.g., Lenn v. Pierson, 37 Cal. App. 171, 173 P. 763 (1918) (use of silk instead of
catgut sutures in abdominal operation); Goode v. Lothrop, 266 Mass. 518, 165 N.E. 688 (1929)
(plastic surgery on nose); Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont., 645, 194 P. 488 (1920) (general anesthesia for
reduction of fracture).
115. See, e.g., Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d 695 (1939) (injury to peroneal
nerve at time of knee surgery); Prewitt v. Higgins, 231 Ky. 678, 22 S.W.2d 115 (1929) (infection of
arm following injection of drug); Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946) (frac-
tures at time of electroshock).
116. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wallace, 6 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935) (sponge left in
abdomen at time of Caesarean section); Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932)
(sponge left in abdomen at time of pelvic surgery); Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E,2d
242 (1941) (sponge left in operative wound in thigh); Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 A.2d 1007
(1913) (gauze left at time of surgery for tuberculosis peretonitis).
117. See, e.g., Vergeldt v. Hartzell, 1 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1924) (roof of patient's mouth pene-
trated with dental drill); Dohr v. Smith, 104 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1958) (dentist allowed bridgework
broken during surgery to fall into and injure the bronchus); Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363,
83 N.W.2d 296 (1957) (tongue cut by dentist's drill).
118. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Burgeson, 26 Cal. App. 2d 235, 79 P.2d 136 (1938) (wrong tooth
removed).
119. See, e.g., Nelson v. Painless Parker, 104 Cal. App. 770, 286 P. 1078 (1930); Whetstine v.
Moravec, 228 Iowa 352, 291 N.W. 425 (1940); Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemn. Co., 61 So. 2d
901 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
120. See, e.g., Micek v. Weaver-Jackson Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 19, 54 P.2d 768 (1936); Vonault
v. O'Rourke, 97 Mont. 92, 33 P.2d 535 (1934); White v. Hines, 182 N.C. 275, 109 S.E. 31 (1921);
Nopson v. Wockner, 40 Wash. 2d 645, 245 P.2d 1022 (1952). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 40 (4th ed. 1971).
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rence of some inexplicable event.1 21 At least one jurisdiction refuses to
apply the doctrine to malpractice claims. 122
IV. DENTISTS' LIABILITY FOR TRANSMITTING HEPATITIS TO THEIR
PATIENTS
A. Negligence-a Deviationfrom the Standard of Care
The transmission of hepatitis from the dentist to his patient alone
does not result in the imposition of liability. The plaintiff must also
demonstrate that the dentist was negligent-that he deviated from ac-
cepted dental practices. 123 As discussed earlier, dentist-patient trans-
mission of HBV generally occurs when microscopic amounts of blood
from the dentist's hand mixes with the patient's.saliva in the oral cav-
ity.124 In fact, no documented cases cite improper sterilization proce-
dures as the cause of transmission. 125 Further, while studies
demonstrate that the use of barriers such as gloves and masks greatly
decrease the incidence of this mode of transmission, only a small frac-
tion of dentists employ such measures in their treatment of patients. 126
A majority of oral surgeons, however, do use gloves during surgical
procedures. 127 Because of this divergence in the adopted standard of
care courts will treat general dentists and oral surgeons differently for
purposes of liability analysis.
For instance, because the established standard of care for oral sur-
geons includes wearing gloves,' 28 it is very likely that a deviation from
this standard (not wearing gloves) is likely to result in liability if the
patient contracts HBV.' 29 The patient must prove that he contracted
the disease from the oral surgeon and that the lack of gloves proxi-
mately caused the transmission.' 30 Liability analysis is the same for
121. See, e.g., Washington v. City of Columbus, 136 Ga. App. 682, 222 S.E.2d 583 (1975).
122. See, e.g., id (courts still allow the doctrine to be used against nonphysicians).
123. For a discussion of the negligence doctrine and the deviation from the accepted standard
of care requirement, see supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text. Seealso infra notes 125-35 and
accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
125. Id
126. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
128. Id
129. Id See supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. For purposes of a discussion of oral surgeons,
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both asymptomatic and known carriers. 13'
A general dentist, however, is subject to a different analysis. The
standard of the dental profession does not require that general dentists
wear gloves.' 32 If the dentist nicks his finger while not wearing gloves,
and subsequently the patient develops hepatitis, courts will not hold the
dentist liable. 33 The dentist did not deviate from the existing dental
standard. 34
The knowledge of the dental profession obscures this analysis. Al-
though the ADA only recommends gloves during surgical proce-
dures, 3 5 most medical literature recommends gloves anytime a
dentist's hand enters the patient's oral cavity. 136 Thus, a dentist's fail-
ure to wear gloves deviates from the standard of care possessed, albeit
not exercised, by the dental profession. 137
Public policy weighs in favor of such a position. 38 First, the dental
profession's current standard is obsolete in light of the available re-
search concerning the HBV incidence rate among dentists and the fre-
quency of dentist-patient transmissions. 1 9  Second, the risks and
seriousness of transmitting HBV far outweigh the relative simplicity of
wearing gloves. 140 Under this approach, no distinction between asymp-
tomatic and known carriers exists. 14 1 Only a jurisdiction that adopts a
Helling v. Carey'42 formulation of the standard of care, however,
would accept this analysis. 143
the distinction between the "locality" and "national" standard is irrelevant. An oral surgeon is a
specialist and a majority of courts hold them to a national standard of conduct. See supra note 70.
131. Because the profession firmly established the standard of care, whether the oral surgeon
knew he carried the virus becomes irrelevant. If he deviates from the accepted standard of care
and harm results, he can be held liable. See supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
137. Id
138. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 23-31 & 51 and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 52.
141. Whether the dentist knew he was an asymptomatic carrier becomes irrelevant under this
analysis. If the dentist did not adopt prudent behavior based on the skill and knowledge possessed
by the profession, he would be liable especially because the benefits of taking such precaution far
outweighed any perceived inconvenience. See supra notes 51 & 74-77 and accompanying text.
142. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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Unfortunately a majority of jurisdictions would not reach this result.
A distinction exists, however, between asymptomatic and known carri-
ers.'" The dental profession requires dental carriers of HBV to use
disposable masks and rubber gloves when working with patients. 145 If
a known carrier transmits the disease while not using such precautions
he deviates from acceptable dental practice 146  and he would be
liable.'
47
This question lacks clarity for known carriers who transmit the dis-
ease despite taking adequate precautions. 48  Courts probably would
not impose liability in this situation.149  First, a dentist is not a guaran-
tor of good results. 5 Second, the dentist adhered to the accepted stan-
dard of care.'5 ' Public policy also weighs in favor of nonhiability.152
144. See infra text accompanying note 146.
145. See supra note 53.
146. Id
147. A clear deviation from an established standard of care creates liability. See supra notes
57-79 and accompanying text.
148. This possibility exists because gloves with only microscopic leaks can allow enough in-
fected blood to pass through to transmit the disease to a patient. See supra note 52.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 151-53.
150. See, e.g., Lejeune v. United States Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 191, 194 (W.D. La. 1976);
Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 203, 260 A.2d 825, 833 (1970); Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or. 559,
562, 130 P.2d 944, 945 (1942).
151. That the dentist adhered to the accepted standard of care weighs against imposing liabil-
ity. See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
152. Public policy abhors liability without fault, except for strict liability offenses. See W.
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 75 (4th ed. 1971). See also St. Luke's Hospital v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo.
353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975). This case involved a plaintiff who sued a hospital when he contracted
post-transfusion hepatitis. In holding the hospital nonliable, the court cited COLO. REV. STAT.
§13-22-104(1) (1973), which provides as follows:
The availability of scientific knowledge, skills and materials from the transplantation,
injection, transfusion or transfer of human tissue, organs, blood or components thereof is
important to the health and welfare of the people of this state. Equally important is the
duty of those performing such services or providing such materials to exercise due care
under the attending circumstances to the end that those receiving health care will benefit
and adverse results therefrom will be minimized by the use of available and proven
scientific safeguards. The imposition of legal liability without fault upon the persons and
organizations engaged in such scientific procedures may inhibit the exercise of sound
medical judgment and restrict the availability of important scientific knowledge, skills
and materials. It is, therefore, the public policy of this state to promote the health and
welfare of the people by emphasizing the importance of exercising due care, and by
limiting the legal liability arising out of such scientific procedures to instances of negli-
gence or willful misconduct.
Id. at 355-56, 534 P.2d at 782. Though liability will not result, state health officials would proba-
bly not allow such a dentist to continue his practice. See Dentist ldentfedat Hepatitis Carrier, Los
Angeles Times, Sept. 25, 1975 at 25, col. 1; Watkins, Viral Hepatitis B: A Special Problem in Pre-
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B. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent enables a patient to hold a dentist
liable for bad results even though he took all adequate precautions and
was not negligent. 153 Because this doctrine rests on risk disclosure, the
distinction between known and asymptomatic carriers becomes
crucial.154
Liability for known carriers is a virtual certainty under either the
medical standard 5 5 or the material risk standard of informed con-
sent.' 56 The medical standard test asks whether a reasonably prudent
carrier dentist would disclose the risks of hepatitis transmission to his
patient. 157 All dentists in this position would disclose the risks of hepa-
titis transmission because the dental standards require such disclo-
sure.158  Also, all state health authorities faced with this issue require
the dental carriers to inform their patients of their carrier status. 5 9
The material risk formulation questions whether the reasonably pru-
dent man would consider the risk crucial when making his decision
concerning proposed treatment.' 61 Clearly, the possibility of con-
tracting a severe disease would weigh heavily in the reasonable man's
decisionmaking process. One argument that favors nonliability for
such disclosure is that courts do not require disclosure of remote risks
inherent in standard procedures.' 6 ' However, though the risk of con-
tracting hepatitis, even from a known carrier, may be remote, it is not a
risk inherent in standard procedures. Rather, the risk depends upon
vention, 6 J. AM. SOC'Y PREVENTATIVE DENTISTRY 9 (1976). See also Must Hepatitis Carriers Stop
Treating their Patients, Med-World News, Dec. 15, 1975 at 37, col. 2.
153. An action in informed consent does not involve the question whether the defendant pro-
ceeded correctly and with adequate precautions. Rather, plaintiffs base this cause of action on the
physician's duty to disclose certain'facts about the proposed procedure. If the defendant does not
disclose a risk that results from treatment, he may be liable. This finding depends on whether the
undisclosed risk should have been disclosed. Whether a jurisdiction adopts a "material risk" or a
"medical" standard governs the scope of disclosure. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying
text.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 157-72.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
157. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 53.
159. Id
160. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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the dentist's carrier status. 62
Under either formulation, the patient must prove proximate cause.163
The patient must assert that if the dentist disclosed the risk of hepatitis
transmission, he would have withheld consent.'" Convincing a court
that but for the nondisclosure the patient would have foregone a life-
saving or crucial treatment is a difficult task. 65 Claims arising from
dental care, however, eliminate this burden for the plaintiff because
dental maladies do not generally threaten the patient's life. Also, be-
cause the risk of HBV transmission is not inherent in dental proce-
dures, the patient could choose to use another, non-carrier, dentist.
Hence, the patient is likely to satisfy both the subjective and the objec-
tive tests of proximate cause. 166
Asymptomatic carrier dentists pose a different problem because they
lack a reason to warn their patients of the risk of hepatitis. Courts
generally do not require disclosure of unknown risks. 167 Because den-
tists know that HBV presents an occupational hazard, however, courts
may decide that dentists should know the risks of transmitting the dis-
ease. 168 The availability of a highly accurate serological test weighs in
favor of this rationale 69 because a dentist can test himself periodically
to determine whether he carries the HBV virus. 70 That routine sero-
logical testing is not currently a standard of the dental profession
weighs against this position. 7'
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The res ipsa loquitur theory presents the most unlikely candidate for
162. A dentist who is not a carrier cannot transmit the disease. See supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
164. Id
165. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. The subjective test poses a relatively
easy burden. The plaintiff only asserts that he would have opted out of the treatment had he
known of the risk of hepatitis. The objective test is generally more difficult to prove because the
decision to withhold consent must be reasonable. Nevertheless, a plaintiff could easily convince a
jury that, given a choice, the reasonable man would prefer a noncarrier to a carrier dentist.
167. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
170. Id
171. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. In fact, the ADA does not recommend
routine serological testing. Id.
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a successful malpractice claim against a dentist who transmits hepatitis.
For malpractice claims courts generally require that the injury be that
type from which the layperson, drawing upon common knowledge and
experience, infers negligence.' 72 Courts have held that idiopathic in-
fections do not meet this test. 173
The common knowledge and experience of most laypersons does not
include HBV. Courts require expert testimony to describe for the jury
the mode of transmission, preventative measures, and the applicable
dental standard of care. 74 In addition, res ipsa loquitur should not
apply because the transmission can occur even when the dentist took
all adequate precautions. 17
V. CONCLUSION
The mode of transmission of HBV puts dentists at an especially high
risk of contracting the disease, and later, of transmitting it to unsuspect-
ing patients.' 76 Although a general dentist could reduce the risk by
wearing gloves or using other preventative measures during all proce-
dures, the profession currently does not require it.' 77 Consequently,
courts are not likely to hold dentists liable for transmitting the disease
pursuant to a negligence theory, unless they adopt a Helling v. Carey
analysis.' 7 8
Liability of dentists is more likely to rest on informed consent. If a
dentist knows or has reason to know that he carries HBV, a failure to
inform the patient of the risks of contracting the disease constitutes
negligence.' 79 Moreover, due to the nature of HBV, a dentist's knowl-
edge that he is a potential carrier may be sufficient to invoke a disclo-
sure requirement.8 0  Regardless, the risk of harm to patients clearly
172. See supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Konat, 181 Neb. 30, 146 N.W.2d 743 (1966) (patient developed
staphyloccal infection); Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 260 A.2d 825 (1970) (patient contracted
tetanus after dental procedure). For discussion of the rationale of these decisions, see infra text
accompanying notes 175-76.
174. The mode of transmission, preventative measures and dental standards of hepatitis ex-
ceeds the common knowledge of most laymen. See supra notes 20-25 & 31-55 and accompanying
text.
175. See supra notes 49 & 53.
176. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 136-48.
179. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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outweighs the burden on dentists to use precautionary measures.
Adoption of such procedures would protect patients from the danger of
disease as well as reduce the dentists' own risks of liability.
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